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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-1-608 (Supp. 1987) to entertain this appeal from the 
Decision and Summary Judgment issued by the Tax Division of the 
Third Judicial District Court on December 23, 1986.1 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Plaintiff-Appellant Kennecott Copper Corporation 
("Kennecott") originally brought this case under Utah Code Ann. § 
59-11-11 (1953) , as amended to recover taxes paid under protest 
to Salt Lake County. The defendants in that action (presently 
the defendants-appellants) were Salt Lake County, Arthur L. 
Monson and Milton Yorgason (the "County") and the State Tax 
Commission of Utah ("Tax Commission") (presently a defendant-
respondent) . 2 in Rio Algom Corporation v. San Juan County, 6 81 
P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) , this Court resolved the underlying legal 
basis for Kennecottfs claim against the plaintiff-Kennecott. 
1
 The Appellant Salt Lake County states that this Court's 
jurisdiction is founded upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(1953) , as amended. That section merely provides in part that 
the Supreme Court has jurisdiction "over any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction." Section 59-1-608 provides in part that "The sole 
and exclusive remedy for review of a decision or order of the tax 
division of any district court shall be by appeal to the Supreme 
Court. . . . " 
2 The County's opening brief lists the "State Tax Commission of 
Utah" as an appellant in the caption. That listing is incorrect 
since the County has appealed from a judgment granting the Tax 
Commission's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In this 
appeal, the Tax Commission stands in the same position as 
Kennecott. It is a respondent. 
-2-
Thereafter the County pursued its counterclaim against Kennecott 
and its crossclaim against the Tax Commission in the district 
court. Kennecott and the Tax Commission each filed a Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings in the district court, which the court 
granted. 
The County has taken the present appeal from the district 
court's Order and Summary Judgment granting those motions. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17 (1953), as amended, now 
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (Supp. 1987), permits the 
County to force the Tax Commission to reassess Kennecott1s 
property because it is allegedly underassessed. 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1953), as amended (the 
"net proceeds" formula by which the Tax Commission assessed 
Kennecott's mining claims) violates Article XIII, sections 2 and 
3 of the Utah Constitution.3 
3 The Tax Commission agrees with Kennecott's framing of the 
issues involved in this appeal, but has intentionally restricted 
the issues discussed in this brief to those facing the Tax 
Commission. As a Second Cause of Action in its crossclaim, the 
County asserted that the Tax Commission had failed to disclose to 
the County requested information about Kennecott1s assessment. 
Although the district court granted the Tax Commissions Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the County's Second 
Cause of Action in its crossclaim (Rec. 1012), the County does 
not raise the disclosure issue on appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 19, 1982, Kennecott filed an action under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-11-11 (1953), as amended, (now Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
1411 (Supp. 1987)) seeking recovery of property taxes it paid the 
County. Kennecott1s complaint asked the court to declare that 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (1953), as amended was unconstitutional 
because it afforded taxation relief to locally assessed property 
but not centrally or state assessed property. 
On June 25, 1982, the County filed its Answer, 
counterclaimed against Kennecott and crossclaimed against the Tax 
Commission. The County alleged in its counterclaim that 
Kennecottfs property had been undervalued by the Tax Commission, 
and that the County, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17, 
should therefore be permitted to reassess the property for the 
immediately preceding five years and to collect taxes on the 
reassessed value. (Rec. 56-57). 
The County's crossclaim against the Tax Commission 
incorporated the counterclaim against Kennecott. Presumably upon 
the same basis as its counterclaim, the County crossclaimed that 
the Tax Commission could be ordered to reassess Kennecottfs 
property according to what the County called "assessment 
practices that will bring the Plaintiff's property . . . up to 
their full cash value . . ." (Rec. 60) The crossclaim did not 
specify what "assessment practices11 were supposedly incorrect, 
except to allege that the "net proceeds" formula mandated under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (1953), as amended (by which the Tax 
Commission values "mining claims") was unconstitutional. Id. 
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This Court resolved the case-in-chief against Kennecott in 
Rio Algom Corporation v, San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1984). Specifically, that case upheld the constitutionality of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 against Kennecottfs claim that the 
imposition of unequal tax rates on state and local assessed 
property, as authorized by that statute, violated the federal and 
state constitutions. The parties thereafter stipulated that the 
original action was no longer part of the proceeding. 
The County's counterclaim and crossclaim then remained the 
outstanding matters for resolution before the district court. 
Both Kennecott and the Tax Commission thereafter challenged the 
County's standing to file its counterclaim and crossclaim. In 
Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 456 
(Utah 1985) , this Court held that the County had standing to seek 
"judicial review" of its counterclaim against Kennecott and its 
crossclaim against the Tax Commission. 
On September 18, 1986 Kennecott filed a Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings with respect to the County's counterclaim, and 
on September 26, 1986, the Tax Commission filed its own Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the County's 
crossclaim. (Rec. 725-727, 742-744). The County followed with 
its Motion for Summary Judgment to which it had attached various 
affidavits and documents. (Rec. 771-867) . 
On November, 26, 1986, the district court heard oral 
argument on the foregoing motions and on Kennecott's Motion to 
Strike joined by the Tax Commission and on the Tax Commission's 
own Motion to Strike. (Rec. 1004). 
-5-
After a two and one-half hour hearing, the district court 
ruled from the bench. The district court: (1) granted 
Kennecott's and the Tax Commission's respective Motions to 
Strike; (2) denied the County's Motion for Summary Judgment; (3) 
granted Kennecott's and the Tax Commission's respective Motions 
for Judgment on the Pleadings; and (4) dismissed the County's 
counterclaim and crossclaim with prejudice. (Rec. 1004, 1013). 
In the subsequently issued Decision and Summary Judgment, 
the district court held with respect to the County's crossclaini 
against the Tax Commission that: 
The Court rules that Salt Lake County's 
crossclaim First Cause of Action against the 
State Defendants is improper in that 
underassessment is not, and does not 
constitute grounds for, escaped assessment; 
and further, that the net proceeds method of 
assessing metalliferous mines and mining 
claims set out in Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57, 
1953, as amended, is constitutional . . . . 
(Rec. 1012).4 
The County then brought the present appeal. On August 17, 
1987, Kennecott filed a Motion to Strike various addenda the 
County had included in its opening brief to this Court and upon 
which the County had constructed a substantial part of its 
argument. See, e±SL± Brief of Appellant at 11-15. The Tax 
Commission joined Kennecott's motion. 
On September 11, 1987 this Court granted the Respondent-
Kennecott's Motion to Strike. 
4 The district court's Decision and Summary Judgment with respect 
to the County's counterclaim against Kennecott is quoted in 
Kennecott's brief. 
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission agrees with the arguments Kennecott 
advances in its brief. For that reason, it does not serve any 
useful purpose for the Tax Commission to duplicate those 
arguments here. Instead, this brief merely summarizes what the 
Tax Commission understands are the salient points of Kennecott's 
arguments and devotes the bulk of discussion to supplementary 
argument. 
The County cannot recover additional taxes from Kennecott 
for 1981 and four years prior thereto under Utah Code Ann. § 59-
5-17 (1953) , as amended because the Tax Commission allegedly 
undervalued or underassessed Kennecott's taxable property. 
Neither can the County force the Tax Commission to reassess 
Kennecott's taxable property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-17 
(1953) , as amended because that statute affords a remedy only to 
property which has escaped assessment, not property that is 
allegedly underassessed; and because the statute, under any 
circumstance, applies only to the County Assessor, not the Tax 
Commission. 
The County is not entitled to a declaration as to the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 (the "net proceeds" 
statute) because it cannot force a reassessment of Kennecott's 
taxable property, and because, as a result, this Court should 
avoid passing upon constitutional questions that are unnecessary 
to a determination of the merits. In any event, Utah Code Ann. § 
59-5-57 (1953) , as amended is constitutional because the 
legislature has broad powers under the Utah Constitution to tax 
metalliferous minerals as it deems proper. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COUNTY CANNOT FORCE THE TAX COMMISSION TO REASSESS 
KENNECOTT1S PROPERTY UNDER UTAH'S ESCAPED ASSESSMENT STATUTE, 
The County's opening brief does not directly address the 
crossclaim against the Tax Commission. Point I of the County's 
brief discusses the constitutionality of section 59-5-57 (the 
"net proceeds" statute). Points II and III of the County's brief 
are devoted to arguing that an alleged undervaluation is the 
statutory equivalent of an escaped assessment. Yet the brief 
concludes its discussion of these points with the statement that 
it was error for the trial court to dismiss Salt Lake County's 
counterclaim with prejudice. Brief of Appellant at 13 and 17. 
It is consequently difficult to understand upon what basis the 
County thinks the district court allegedly errored in dismissing 
the County's crossclaim if the County makes no mention of the 
5 
crossclaim in its brief. 
The crossclaim incorporates by reference the first four 
paragraphs of the counterclaim against Kennecott. (Rec. 57). 
Paragraph four of the counterclaim alleges: 
That the properties owned by the Plaintifff 
both real and personal, located within Salt 
Lake County, have been underassessed by the 
State Tax Commission of Utah, thereby 
resulting in the Plaintiff's receiving a 
benefit at the expense of the other taxpayers 
5 The basis of the County's crossclaim has always been somewhat 
vague. Kennecott states in its brief that "The County also 
crossclaimed against the Commission, asking that the Commission 
be required to value Kennecott's property in a fashion which was 
not pled or specified. . ." Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 2. 
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of Salt Lake County, which benefit is 
contrary to law and, in particular, a 
violation of Article 13, Section 3 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 
(Rec. 54)(emphasis added) • 
The County then continues in its crossclaim to allege that 
the Tax Commission has undervalued Kennecottfs taxable property, 
including personal property and improvements (paragraph 6) and 
further alleges that the Tax Commission, by implementing section 
59-5-57 has caused an undervaluation of Kennecott's mining claims 
(paragraph 8). (Rec. 57-59). It is not clear from the 
crossclaim upon what basis the County claims a cause of action 
against the Tax Commission. 
Two theories are possible. First, the County alleges that 
the Tax Commission, by valuing Kennecott's mining claims 
according to section 59-5-57, has unconstitutionally undervalued 
those claims. Second, the County alleges that the Tax 
Commission's general valuation techniques have undervalued all of 
Kennecott's property, including improvements and personal 
property. The County's crossclaim does not clarify, even 
conceding that the County has standing to seek judicial review, 
how the County's claims for relief could be granted against the 
Tax Commission for such alleged undervaluation. 
6 This Court has previously characterized the County's crossclaim 
as alleging (1) that section 59-5-57 is unconstitutional and (2) 
that the Tax Commission's valuation methods in general do not 
reflect full cash value. 702 P. 2d at 456. The Court then held 
that the County was entitled to judicial review of those claims 
without intimating what the outcome of that review should be. 
Id. 
_9_ 
The County's constitutional claims against the Tax 
Commission are discussed in the next section of this brief. The 
other aspect of the crossclaim, however, is presumably based upon 
the theory that undervaluation is the equivalent of "escaped 
assessment11 as the latter term is used in section 59-5-17 , and 
that the County Assessor can therefore perform the assessment the 
Utah Constitution and statutes specifically delegate to the Tax 
Commission. 
This theory is without merit for the reasons explained in 
Kennecott's brief. Specifically, Kennecott is correct in arguing 
that the County Assessor cannot reassess allegedly undervalued 
property under section 59-5-17 now recodified at Utah Code Ann. § 
59-2-309 (Supp. 1987) . Kennecott points out that only property 
omitted from the tax rolls, or which has not been "listed for 
taxation", is property which has "escaped assessment" within the 
meaning of section 59-5-17. Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 8-
9. The County's pleadings make no allegation that any of 
Kennecottfs property has "escaped assessment" only that 
Kennecott*s property has allegedly been undervalued or 
underassessed. Given that allegation, the virtually undisputed 
law in this and other jurisdictions, as restated by the Tax 
Commission in Nupetco Associates v. County Board of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, Appeal No. 84-18-1600, is: 
Property which has been undervalued due to a 
clerical mistake in the quantity of the 
property to be assessed or in the assessed 
valuation does not result in property which 
has escaped valuation. 
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See Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 8-9. Cases from this 
jurisdiction cited in support of Kennecott1s argument are Union 
Portland Cement Co. v. Morgan County, 230 P. 1020 (Utah 1924); 
and Builders Component Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22 Utah 2d 172f 
450 P.2d 97 (1969) . 
In addition to the points Kennecott makes, it should be 
stressed that section 59-5-17, which gives the County Assessor 
the statutory right to reassess property that has "escaped" 
assessment, has no bearing upon the Tax Commission's 
constitutional and statutory duties. Kennecott briefly discusses 
this under Point I C of its brief by demonstrating that the 
County is not the assessor of Kennecott1s property. See Brief of 
Respondent at 12. From the Tax Commission's perspective, the 
same point should be reinforced. 
The very case upon which the County relies to give it 
standing, Kennecott Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451 
(Utah 1985), holds in addition that the Tax Commission has the 
exclusive constitutional responsibility for assessing "mines and 
mining claims." As this Court stated in the Kennecott > 702 P.2d 
at 457: 
Article XIII, Section 11, provides for 
creation of the Tax Commission and provides 
that the Tax Commission shall "assess mines 
and public utilities." In State ex rel. 
Public Service Commission v. Southern Pacific 
Co., we held that Article XIII, Section 11, 
limits the Legislature's power to confer the 
power of assessment on any other governmental 
entity. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The Tax Commission clearly has the undelegable 
constitutional duty to assess "mines". It follows that the 
County, by seeking to compel a reassessment of Kennecottfs 
property under section 59-5-17 is likewise asking the judiciary 
either to (1) apply section 59-5-17 to the Tax Commission and 
force it to reassess the property; or (2) permit the County 
Assessor to reassess Kennecottfs property again under section 59-
5-17. Both remedies are inappropriate. The judiciary cannot 
grant the first remedy because it has no constitutional 
prerogative to rewrite section 59-5-17 and make it apply to the 
Tax Commission instead of the County Assessor.7 The second 
remedy is inappropriate because the Tax Commissionr not the 
County Assessor, has the sole constitutional responsibility of 
assessing mines. 
The County attempts to sustain its counterclaim by arguing 
that an undervaluation can be equated with escaped assessment, 
thereby making section 59-5-17 an appropriate remedy against 
Kennecott and presumably against the Tax Commission as well. The 
basis for this argument is a proffered distinction between Union 
Portland Cement and the County's counterclaim and crossclaim. 
The County claims that "over $500 million worth of minerals 
produced by Kennecott in 1981 had a value for tax purposes of 
7 Utah Const, art. V sec. 1 provides in pertinent part that "no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments [Executive, Legislative and Judicial] 
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others 
• • • •" See also Timpanogsos Planning and Water Management 
Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, 690 P.2d 562, 
564 (Utah 1984) wherein this Court expressed a "reluctance to 
encroach upon the legislature's powers to make laws . . . ." 
-12-
zero (0) in 1981." Therefore, says the County, these minerals 
"escaped" assessment and can be reassessed by the County 
Assessor. Brief of Appellant at 11. 
The defects in this argument are at least twofold: 
First, as an evidentiary matter, there was no record before 
the trial court or this Court to the effect that "over $500 
million" worth of minerals has "escaped" taxation, assuming for 
argument's sake that "escaped" means "undervalued." The addenda 
included with the County's brief imply that the "minerals" not 
taxed are supposedly worth an extraordinary amount. But those 
addenda were stricken both by the trial court and this Court. 
(Rec. 1007). Factually, therefore, there is no evidentiary 
support for the County's statement. 
Second, Kennecott demonstrates that section 59-5-17 was 
intended as a remedy for those instances in which the taxing 
authority errored by overlooking and/or omitting taxable property 
from the rolls that should have been included. See Brief of 
Respondent Kennecott at 9-12. Section 59-5-17 was not intended 
to overrule specific statutory authority — in this instance, 
section 59-5-57 which mandates in pertinent part: 
. . . there shall be no valuation based 
upon net annual proceeds for the purpose of 
assessment of any such mine or mining claim 
for any one year in which there were no gross 
proceeds realized in the year next preceding 
the year of assessment . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
The County's attempt to distinguish Union Portland Cement by 
equating an oversight of fact with a mandate of law is wholly 
inadequate. 
-13-
THE COUNTY IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REASSESSMENT OF KENNECOTTfS 
PROPERTY BECAUSE KENNECOTT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF THE 
ROLLBACK INTENDED FOR LOCALLY ASSESSED PROPERTIES, 
Point III of the County's brief restates the arguments just 
discussed by claiming that Kennecott's property received a 
rollback in value for 1981, that a rollback constitutes "escaped 
assessment", and thatf accordingly, the court may order the Tax 
Commission to reassess Kennecott's property. See Brief of 
Appellant 13. Kennecott, which also assumes that it received a 
rollback for 1981, responds to this argument by reasserting its 
position that allegedly undervalued property cannot be reassessed 
under section 59-5-17. Kennecott states: 
As is amply pointed out in this Brief, the 
allegation by the County is not that 
Kennecott's property was not assessed at all, 
but that Kennecott1s property was undervalued 
and underassessed as a result of the 
application of the roll back in 1981 and the 
years prior thereto. Clearly, under Point I 
above, the escaped assessment statute relied 
upon by the County does not apply and may not 
properly be used to have Kennecott's property 
revalued for the years in question. 
Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 24. 
As explained above, Kennecott's argument is correct. 
Kennecott does not mention, however, that there was no conclusive 
evidence before the trial court that the Tax Commission, rightly 
or wrongly, ever gave Kennecott the rollback it assumes it 
received. John Stewart's affidavit,8 the only affidavit which 
8
 John Stewart is the Supervisor of Mine Valuation for the 
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 
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was not stricken below, states unequivocally: 
For the tax years 1981 and 1982, the Property 
Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission 
valued Kennecott1s property as follows: a) 
Kennecott1s personal property was valued at 
it's fair market value, meaning historical 
cost less depreciation. b) Kennecottfs 
improvements, meaning improvements to 
existing structures attached to the land, 
were valued at a 1978 base year value and 
then multiplied by a factor or "factored up" 
to current fair market value. c) 
Kennecottfs mining claims were valued at the 
statutory rate mandated by Utah Code Ann. 
§59-5-57. • . 
The statement in Mr. Yorgason's [stricken] 
affidavit (and repeated in Mike Reed's 
[stricken] affidavit, pages 9 and 11 of 
Exhibit A) which claims that Kennecott's 
property for 1981 and 1982 was "rolled back 
to their 1789 [sic] level" is categorically 
false. 
(Rec. 872). 
Although the County and Kennecott both make their respective 
arguments assuming that Kennecott had received a "rollback" for 
1981, the only evidence before the district court is ambiguous, 
inconclusive or to the contrary. Consequently, it appears that 
the County, under Point III of its brief, may be asking the court 
9 
to redress an injury that it never received. 
5 The Tax Commission does not intend by this statement to suggest 
that the case ought to be remanded. Kennecott's argument, that 
undervaluation is not a basis for reassessment, is fully 
dispositive of this case even though the property was arguably 
never "undervalued" by the "rollback". 
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Ill 
THE COUNTY MAY NOT HAVE KENNECOTT1S PROPERTY REASSESSED IN 
DISREGARD OF THE NET PROCEEDS METHOD BECAUSE THE ORIGINALLY 
ASSESSED VALUE IS NOT HIGH ENOUGH, 
A. THE NET PROCEEDS FORMULA CODIFIED AT SECTION 59-5-57 IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL, 
The County's principal crossclaim against the Tax Commission 
appears to be that the "net proceeds" formula codified at section 
59-5-57 is unconstitutional. In reply, the Tax Commission agrees 
with Kennecott that section 59-5-57 is constitutional because the 
legislature has broad power to determine the method of assessing 
mines in Utah. See Brief of Respondent Kennecott at 20-21. It 
thus makes no sense to argue that the legislature's exercise of 
its constitutional powers to assess mines under Article XIII 
section 4 of the Utah Constitution conflicts with Article XIII 
sections 2 and 3 of the same constitution. The only 
constitutional limitation on the legislature under Article XIII 
section 4 is that mining claims "shall be assessed" and that the 
method in use as of 1931 when section 4 was amended "shall not be 
changed before January lf 1935." 
Obviously, the legislature cannot simply ignore the 
requirements of Article XIII sections 2 and 3 in determining the 
methods of assessment under section 4. But this Court, in Rio 
AlgoiTtf has already decided that: 
Thus, §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII permit the 
Legislature to adopt means to achieve that 
degree of uniformity in valuation that is 
practicably attainable within the general 
confines of the term "market value." 
Id. 681 P.2d at 192. 
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The legislature/ in short/ has broad powers to prescribe 
procedures for determining fair market value and broad powers to 
determine the means by which mines shall be taxed. Reading 
Article XIII sections 2, 3 and 4 together makes it virtually 
indisputable that the legislature can constitutionally tax 
metalliferous mines and mining claims as it deems proper. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT PASS UPON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SECTION 59-5-57 . 
Notwithstanding the arguments made in the preceding 
paragraph that section 59-5-57 is constitutional/ this Court 
should consider avoiding the constitutional question altogether. 
As explained in part I of this brief/ the County has no cause of 
action against Kennecott for an alleged undervaluation of its 
property. Neither can the County force the Tax Commission to 
reassess Kennecott1s property because (1) section 59-5-17 does 
not apply to the Tax Commission/ as explained in part I of this 
brief; and (2) the County failed to protest Kennecott's 
assessment before the Tax Commission/ as explained in Point II of 
Kennecott's brief. 
Because the County cannot force a reassessment of 
Kennecott's property/ the County's constitutional claim becomes 
moot. Stated another wayf it makes no sense to adjudicate a 
constitutional issue if the alleged injury of undervaluation 
cannot be redressed. This appeal should be resolved in its 
entirety upon the principle that an alleged underassessment is 
not interchangeable with escaped assessment. Were this Court to 
arrive at that conclusion/ it would be unnecessary to determine 
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the constitutionality of section 59-5-57. As a matter of sound 
jurisprudence, the constitutionality of a statute should not be 
passed upon unless it is absolutely necessary for determining the 
merits of the case. See e.g. Lemback v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 
(Utah 1981) in which this Court declined to pass upon a 
constitutional question (judicial preference for maternal 
custody) when the case could be decided upon another basis (best 
interest of the child). 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in this brief and in Kennecott's brief, 
underassessment does not constitute escaped or omitted assessment 
whereby the County Assessor, acting under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
17 (1953), as amended, can reassess Kennecott's taxable property. 
Consequently, the County cannot force a reassessment of 
Kennecott's taxable property because it is allegedly undervalued. 
In addition, the County cannot invoke Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-
17 (1953), as amended, which expressly applies only to the County 
Assessor, as a remedy to force the Tax Commission to reassess 
Kennecott's taxable property. 
Finally, and because the County cannot force a reassessment 
of Kennecott's taxable property, it is unnecessary for this Court 
to decide whether the "net proceeds" formula for taxing 
metalliferous minerals, codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-57 
(1953), is constitutional. In any event, however, the "net 
proceeds" formula is constitutional because the Utah Constitution 
gives the legislature broad powers to determine how metalliferous 
minerals shall be taxed. 
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ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY 
59-5-57. Assessment of mines.—All metalliferous mines and mining 
claims, both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed at $5.00 per acre 
and in addition thereto at a value equal to two times the average net 
annual proceeds thereof for the three calendar years next preceding or 
for as many years next preceding as the mine has been operating, whichever 
is less; provided, however, there shall be no valuation based upon net annual 
proceeds for the purpose of assessment of any such mine or mining claim 
for any one year in which there were no gross proceeds realized in the 
year next preceding the year of assessment. All other mines or mining 
claims and other valuable mineral deposits, including lands containing coal 
or hydrocarbons, shall be assessed at thirty per cent of their reasonable 
fair cash value. All machinery used in mining and all property or surface 
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value 
of any surface use made of mining claims or mining property for other 
than mining purposes shall be assessed at thirty per cent of their reason-
able fair cash value. In all cases where the surface of lands is owned by 
one person and the mineral underlying such lands is owned by another, 
such property rights shall be separately assessed to the respective owners 
In such cases the value of the surface if it is used for other than mining 
purposes shall be assessed by the assessor of the county in which the 
property is situated. 
ADDENDUM 2 
EEVENTE AND TAXATION 
69-5-17. Property escaping assessment—Five-year limitation period on 
assessment—Duties of assessor.—Any property discovered by the assessor 
to have escaped assessment may be assessed at any time as far back as five 
years prior to the time of discovery, and the assessor sbaU enter such 
assessments on the tax rolls in the hands of the county treasurer or else-
where, and when so assessed shall be reported by the assessor to the county 
auditor, if made after the assessment book has been delivered to the county 
treasurer, and the auditor shall charge the county assessor with the taxes 
on such property, and the assessor shall give notice to the person assessed 
therewith and the assessor shall forthwith proceed to secure or collect the 
taxes as provided in chapter 10 of this title. 
ADDENDUM 3 
A*T. XIII, § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
See. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed—Value ascertained—Properties 
exempt—Legislature to provide annual tax for state.] 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. The property of the state, 
counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public 
libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious 
worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for 
private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Tangible per-
sonal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is held for sale or 
processing and which is shipped to final destination outside this state with-
in twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no situs in Utah 
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law 
from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or other-
wise originating within or without the state. Tangible personal property 
present in Utah on January 1, m., held for sale in the ordinary course 
of business and which constitutes the inventory of any retailer, or whole-
saler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may be deemed 
for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. Water 
rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, trans-
mission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or cor-
porations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals 
or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall not be separately 
taxed so long as tbey shall be owned and used exclusively for such 
purposes. Power plants, power transmission lines and other property 
used for generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which 
is used for furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes 
on lauds in the state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the 
extent that such nroDertv is used for such purposes. These exemptions 
ahall accrue to the benefit of the users of water so pumped under such 
regulations as the Legislature may prescribe. The taxes of the indigent 
poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The Legislature may provide for the exemption from 
taxation of homes, homesteads, and personal property, not to exceed $2,000 
in value for homes, homesteads, and all household furnishings, furniture, 
and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in 
maintaining a home for himself and family. Property not to exceed $3,000 
in value, owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the 
military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the 
unmarried widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of 
persons who while serving in the military service of the United States 
or the state of Utah were killed in action or died as a result of such 
service may be exempted as the Legislature may provide. 
The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
•tate for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any 
there be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, suffi-
cient to pay the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, 
within twenty years from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
(As amended November 4, 1930; November 5, 1946; November 4, 195S, 
affective January 1, 1959; November 6, 1962, effective January 1, J963; 
November 3, 1964, effective January 1, 1965; November 5, 196S, effective 
January 1,1969.) 
ART. XIII, l 3 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 8. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property—Exemptions-
Personal income tax—Disposition of revenues] 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of 
assessment and taxation on all tangible property in the atnte[J accord-
fog to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations 
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, *o th;it 
every person and corporation ahull pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the Legislature may 
determine the manner and extent of taxing transient livestock and livestock 
being fed for slaughter to be used for human consumption. Land used 
for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, be assessed 
accordiug to its value for agricultural use without regard to the value it 
may have for other purposes. Intangible property may be exempted from 
taxation as property or it may be taxed in such manner and to such extent 
as the Legislature may provide. Provided that if intangible property be 
taxed as property the rate thereof shall not exceed five mills on each 
dollar of valuation. TThen exempted from taxation as property, the taxable 
income therefrom shall be taxed under any tax based on incomes, but when 
taxed by the state of Utah as property, the income therefrom shall not 
also be taxed. The Legislature may provide for deductions, exemptious, 
and/or offsets on any tax based upon income. The personal income tax 
rates shall be graduated but the maximum rate shall not exceed six per 
cent of net income. No excise tax rate based upon income shall exceed four 
per cent of net income. The rate limitations herein contained for taxes 
based on income and for taxes on intangible property shall be effective 
until January 1, 1937, and thereafter until changed by law by a vote 
of the majority of the members elected to each house of the Legislature. 
All revenue received from taxes on income or from taxes on intangible 
property shall be allocated to the support of the public school system as 
defined in Article X, Section 2 of this Constitution. (As ameuded November 
6, 1900; November 6,190C; November 4,1930; November 5,1946; November 
5, 19G5, effective January 1, I960.) 
